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OPTIMUM
MILITARY SPACE FORCE STRUCTURE 
CHARACTERISTICS
Lt. Colonel Owen E. Jensen 
Deputy Director, Space Systems 
HQ Air Force Space Command
ABSTRACT
This paper describes the characteristics 
of operational military space systems in 
the conceptual (year 2015) future. Many 
studies have been completed in recent 
years, and more are currently underway. 
All seem to have arrived at similar 
conclusions, however. Therefore, this 
paper summarizes what appears to have 
become a shared vision of the future.
Air Force Space Policy tells us that 
there are four mission areas for ac­ 
tivity: Space Support, Force Enhance­ 
ment, Space Control, and Force Appli­ 
cation. The shared vision described here 
covers only the first two. Desired charac­ 
teristics of launch vehicles, satellite 
control systems, and those spacecraft de­ 
signed to assist terrestrial forces are 
presented.
INTRODUCTION
In today's "normalized" Air Force, 
operating and using commands must 
define their conceptual requirements for 
space systems before development and 
acquisition agencies design and build 
them. It is necessary to first know what 
a system must do in order to decide how 
a system will be made and in what quan­ 
tities. These initial concepts are vali­
dated in Statements of Operational Need 
(SONs), giving a top level outline of cap­ 
abilities needed, while avoiding any advo­ 
cacy for specific hardware solutions.
Operational requirements are also neces­ 
sary later in the design process after de­ 
sign options are chosen. Ever more de­ 
tailed requirements must lead develop­ 
ment of ever more detailed designs.
These more detailed requirements even­ 
tually address themselves specifically 
to individual systems - identifying com­ 
munications data rates, geographical 
coverage, operational characteristics, 
etc. Formally, such detailed statements 
are set down in System Operational 
Requirements Documents (SORDs).
This report intends to examine military 
space operations in the conceptual fu­ 
ture. There is no intent here to provide 
detailed (SORD) requirements for sys­ 
tems. Rather, the focus is on concepts. 
The report summarizes requirements 
expressed in many individual SONs, draft 
SONs, and study conclusions. It will con­ 
centrate on general capabilities that are 
required to accomplish given missions in 
the face of projected threats.
No recognition will be made here regard­ 
ing current systems or capabilities. Fis­ 
cal constraints, however, will be con­ 
sidered. The report attempts to define an 
optimum military force to meet the pro­ 
jected threat - - the "perfect (fiscally 
constrained) world."
This is an important point to consider. 
Most planning efforts start with the
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current situation and attempt to project 
or forecast trends. Instead, this report 
assumes we live in the future world 
circa 2015, and describes the optimum 
force structure which should then exist. 
There are three main reasons for taking 
this approach. First, it frees us from 
built-in preferences for present sys­ 
tems. Second, it allows us to move past 
too evident near-term obstacles. Third, 
the time is ripe. It appears that a fairly 
consistent vision of the future is gen­ 
erally shared throughout the present Air 
Force. Enough studies have been com­ 
pleted in the past with such similar con­ 
clusions that a general concensus seems 
to exist. Therefore, what is really set 
down here is a summary of what has be­ 
come a shared vision. This vision should 
be validated as our goal. If this can be 
accomplished, then we may work back­ 
wards and more easily discover mile­ 
stones along the path from the present 
to that shared vision of the future. A 
roadmap can be built leading us from 
here to the re.
In the interest of brevity and avoiding 
security classification, certain essen­ 
tial sections will not be addressed. For 
instance, the future threat is not defined 
in this report. It will be outlined in a 
separate document. Nor will overall in­ 
tegration of space strategy with other 
JCS strategies (Airland Battle, etc.) be 
documented. This, in short, is a state­ 
ment which defines required systems 
capabilities without explaining their 
use.
A few more words are necessary to put 
this effort into perspective. The goal of
operational space planners is to achieve 
"assured mission capability." This is the 
ability to perform assigned space mis­ 
sions, as required, throughout the con­ 
flict spectrum. In order to do this, a com­ 
bination of strategies is needed: Surviv- 
ability, Proliferation, Alternate Means, 
and Launch, comprise the basic strate­ 
gies available. Each has a specific defin­ 
ition and list of activities. It is assumed 
that the reader understands these or can 
find them elsewhere. They will not be ex­ 
pounded upon in this report.
To repeat the central point of this intro­ 
duction, we must understand that once 
operating and using commands agree on a 
"perfect world," defined in terms of re­ 
quired capabilities, then developing and 
acquiring organizations can define op­ 
tions for achieving those goals. Using 
today's systems as a baseline, they can 
trace a roadmap to move efficiently 
toward the required force structure. 
Important milestones become obvious. 
Annual priority lists should develop with 
more consensus. Agreement on the big 
picture, in short, enables easier agree­ 
ment on details.
So, in its "bare bones" state, this report 
will outline only system requirements in 
terms of capabilities which are need- 
ed.These operational capabilities will be 
described for two of the four space mis­ 
sion areas: Space Support and Force 
Enhancement. Space Control, and Force 
Application will be added later. Cap­ 
abilities which cross mission lines will, 
of course, be identified.
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SPACE SUPPORT
Space Support includes two broad areas: 
transportation of assets to space, and 
control of assets on orbit.
SPACE TRANSPORTATION. Future DOD 
space transportation systems may be de­ 
fined in terms of operability and avail­ 
ability. Non-DOD systems (NASA and com­ 
mercial) offer potential additional cap­ 
ability Agreements for emergency use 
of these systems during times of na­ 
tional crisis are required. For dedicated 
DOD systems, however, the following 
applies:
A; OPERABILITY. Military systems, once 
developed and turned over for opera­ 
tions, are supported by military log­ 
istics organizations, maintained at high 
readiness states by military personnel, 
and operated by designated operational 
commands. This should hold true for 
space transportation just as it does for 
air transportation. It should be accom­ 
plished by "normalizing" space systems- 
turning them over to operational 
commands - and continually evolving 
systems with more operational charac­ 
teristics as defined below.
Logistics support for space transporta­ 
tion includes all activities required to 
deliver vehicles, equipment, and mat­ 
erial to Main Operating Bases (MOBs). Air 
Force Logistics Command (AFLC) will be 
responsible for acquisition and contin­ 
uing support of all material, supplies, 
and spare parts for operational military 
space transportation systems. Logistics 
support for space will be incorporated
into existing AFLC procedures and organ­ 
izations. Provisions will include not only 
those supplies necessary for routine, 
peacetime operations, but war readiness 
stocks will be maintained as well. Where 
survivability of space transportation is 
required, necessary plans will be made 
for assured, survivable, wartime supply 
stocks to be on hand.
Maintenance support includes all activ­ 
ities required to place space transporta­ 
tion systems in a flight readiness state 
and maintain them in that condition. 
Maintenance of space transportation 
systems must be performed by routinely 
trained and assigned military personnel. 
Entry level maintenance airmen and NCOs 
assigned space transportation units will 
be required to have no more than a high 
school education and will be trained at 
existing Air Training Command (ATC) 
schools of no more than six months dura­ 
tion. Systems will be designed for sim­ 
plified fault diagnosis and ease of spare 
part replacement. "Remove and replace" 
units will be built to eliminate human 
error and to facilitate rapid completion 
of tasks. If the above characteristics are 
designed into systems, significant O&M 
cost avoidance is expected. Safety 
.should be considered from the beginning 
of the design process to eliminate or 
reduce hazards to the maximum extent 
practiceable. For mobile or survivable 
space transportation systems, War 
Readiness Supply Kits (WRSK) should be 
made available with all tools and criti­ 
cal parts required for field conditions.
Operations of military space transporta­ 
tion systems includes the following
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activities: maintaining connectivity to 
higher headquarters to receive launch 
orders, final preparation for launch (to 
include any required final movement to 
launch points), the actual launch itself, 
and monitoring of flight vehicles during 
the transportation system's mission. Op­ 
erational command centers will be able 
to monitor the readiness of vehicles and 
cargo, select those required for launch, 
direct the launch, monitor the mission, 
and report progress to higher author­ 
ities. Operational launch crews will be 
kept to minimal numbers - as a goal, 
less than twenty. Crews assigned to mon­ 
itor the actual flight of launch vehicles 
will not be specifically assigned to 
launch operations. Instead, crews nor­ 
mally assigned to command and control 
of military spacecraft on-orbit will 
have training, equipment, capacity, and 
flexibility to monitor launch operations 
as they occasionally interplay with nor­ 
mal spacecraft control functions. Hard­ 
ware and procedures for launch vehicles 
themselves will be standardized across 
transportation systems to the maximum 
extent practiceable. Support facilities 
will be austere and interoperable. Sim­ 
plified procedures will permit opera­ 
tions by military crews, routinely 
trained at ATC schools with a maximum 
course length of six months. Again, if 
the above characteristics are designed 
into systems, significant O&M cost 
avoidance is expected.
Mobile and/or survivable space 
transportation systems will be served 
by crews of no more than ten people, and 
be self-contained to the extent that all 
of the above listed operational activi­
ties may be performed by the assigned 
crew.
Security includes both maintenace of 
secrecy and physical protection of space 
transportation systems and supporting 
infrastructure. Security will be a prime 
consideration during the design process, 
and developed according to the level re­ 
quired by the operations to be performed. 
Routine, peacetime launch systems will 
be treated and protected as Class A re­ 
sources. Survivable systems will be de­ 
signed to operate during or following 
conflict. [Technical specifications for 
developing a survivable (mobile) space 
launch capability must be documented 
and analyzed for cost by Systems Com­ 
mand. DARPA has already gained some 
preliminary information from the SSLV 
and Pegasus efforts.] Once costs and 
achieveable capabilities are known with 
some confidence, then relative benefits 
of maintaining wartime on-orbit cap­ 
ability using survivable launch options 
may be compared to other options.
B. AVAILABILITY. Availability includes 
all activities required to place assets 
into space when required.
Availability first includes all activities 
conducted prior to flight. Restrictions to 
availability prior to launch can include 
logistics and maintenance problems with 
the vehicle and its supporting infra­ 
structure, weather constraints, launch 
base security brakdowns, and commun­ 
ications outages. Cost has an impact on 
availablility, and therefore, there is a 
need to keep costs as low as possible. 
The operator's requirement for each
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discrete segment of the space transpor­ 
tation system calls for a state of 
availability or readiness of 90 percent.
Assured availability depends on assured 
logistics support. Therefore, multiple 
sources of all critical components, 
supplies, and material is required.
Where weather is a concern, each seg­ 
ment of the space transportation system 
must be capable of launching through pre­ 
vailing local weather conditions 95 per­ 
cent of the time.
For those segments of the space trans­ 
portation system which must be sur- 
vivable (see following sections of this 
report), standards equal to those of stra­ 
tegic offensive forces which operate 
through space (i.e. ballistic missiles) 
are required.
Availability includes responsiveness. 
Routine, peacetime launch calls will 
require no more than 30 days advance 
notice. Where payloads of similar size 
can be carried on the same type of 
launch vehicle, cargo substitution times 
must be less than seven days. No vehicle 
requiring a launch pad should occupy that 
pad for more than five days under rou­ 
tine conditions.
Peactime launch systems should be de­ 
signed so that they can attain an alert 
status in times of crisis. Launch from 
alert status will take no more than five 
days for specialized cargo (number and 
type of cargos to be specified later). 
Normal (operational payload) launch 
calls from alert will be handled within
72 hours.
For mobile and/or survivable systems, 
launch from alert status will take no 
longer than fifteen minutes. When in op­ 
erational (loaded) status short of alert, 
launch calls will take no longer than 
three hours. Turnaround or reload fol­ 
lowing launch will take no more than 24 
hours.
Performance is a measure of placing 
assets on orbit when required. Mobile 
and/or survivable space transportation 
systems will be able to lift at least 
1500 pounds of cargo to low earth orbit 
(400 NM polar). Peacetime systems will 
have a range of lift capability from 3000 
to 220,000 pounds (400NM polar). Num­ 
bers of each size of vehicle depend on 
the mission model (to be delivered later) 
and technical and cost trades performed 
by Air Force Systems Command (AFSC).
Reliability is a measure that includes all 
activities during and after launch until 
the cargo is delivered to its destination 
in space. Overall space transportation 
system reliability will be greater than 
98 percent.
For consistency of logistics, mainten­ 
ance, and operations, standardized, base­ 
line systems are required. Specialized 
vehicles, configured for unique cargoes, 
are not acceptable.
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SPACECRAFT CONTROL Once delivered to 
a specified operational location in 
space, spacecraft must be accurately 
tracked as to position, maintained in the 
proper location, monitored for state of 
health, commanded to resolve anomalies 
as required, and controlled to provide 
mission data. Operability and avail­ 
ability once again provide meaningful 
measures of merit.
A. OPERABILITY. In the area of space­ 
craft control, experience has been gained 
in the areas of military logistics, main­ 
tenance, and operations. More consolida­ 
tion and standardization of effort is re­ 
quired, however, to develop a truly oper­ 
ational military force structure.
Tracking, monitoring for health, and com­ 
manding must be standardized across all 
military spacecraft. Ground equipment 
should be interoperable and allow any 
node to perform all routine functions for 
any satellite. Air Force Space Command 
(AFSPACECOM) will control all common 
user spacecraft (multiple service, com­ 
mand, and/or organizations involved) as 
well as those developed specifically for 
Air Force use. Therefore, AFSPACECOM 
common formats, communications fre­ 
quencies, protocols, bandwidths, data 
rates, hardware configuration, and pro­ 
cedures will be followed.
Simplified operations will allow rou­ 
tinely trained and assigned military per­ 
sonnel to perform normal, peacetime 
tasks without reference to satellite- 
specific documents. This capability must 
be designed into all future systems. O&M 
cost avoidance is expected. Information
will be presented and commands entered 
in plain English. [By 2015, it is expected 
that the spoken word will be understand­ 
able in digital, machine language. There­ 
fore, most down-reporting and up- 
commanding should be audial.] For 
special circumstances (e.g. anomaly 
resolution) expert systems will assist 
in diagnosis of problems and recom­ 
mendation of actions. Crew sizes will be 
kept small. Mobile, survivable control 
elements will participate in day-to-day 
activities in order to exercise their cap­ 
abilities and rehearse command and con­ 
trol procedures.
AFLC will support all operational space­ 
craft control nodes with required sup­ 
plies. Upgrades necessary to maintain 
normal operations, war readiness ma­ 
terial, and WRSK kits for deployable 
units will also be provided by Logistics 
Command.
Maintenance should include provision for 
equipment self-diagnosis. "Remove and 
replace" units will be built to eliminate 
human error and to facilitate rapid com­ 
pletion of tasks. Entry level maintenance 
personnel will be required to have no 
more than a high school education and 
will be trained at existing ATC schools 
of no more than six months duration.
Security includes both maintenace of 
secrecy and physical protection of space­ 
craft control systems and supporting 
infrastructure. Security will be a prime 
consideration during the design process, 
and developed according to the level 
required by the operations to be per­ 
formed. Routine, peacetime systems will
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be treated and protected as Class A re­ 
sources. Survivable systems will be de­ 
signed to operate during or following con­ 
flict.
B. AVAILABILITY.
Each control node will be designed for 
high reliability. Success in the reli­ 
ability category is measured by the 
ability to complete a "pass" - that is to 
accurately set up and track a scheduled 
spacecraft, contact it to gather state of 
health information, and upload routine 
commands. The required success rate for 
each control node is to complete 95 per­ 
cent of all scheduled "passes" at the 
scheduled time.
Dependence upon vulnerable overseas 
stations will be eliminated. Each control 
node will be located within United 
States territory and be capable of per­ 
forming all required satellite contacts 
without reliance upon any ground site or 
communications transfer point outside 
of that territory. At the same time, an 
ability to stay in continuous contact 
with satellites at any point in their 
orbits is required.
Satellite autonomy is necessary for sur­ 
vival of capability in time of conflict- - 
when ground control nodes may no longer 
be capable of performing their functions. 
Technical, cost, and performance trades 
are needed regarding the required degree 
of space vehicle satellite autonomy. If 
possible, the following capabilities 
should be provided: spacecraft should
be able to survive and continue to oper­ 
ate on orbit without ground contact for 
six months. Minimal drift in position is 
desired. If anomolies are encountered, 
satellites will be capable of "saving" 
themselves until contact is made. 
[Control of mission data is not part of 
this requirement.]
Survivable satellite control and mission 
control nodes on the ground are required. 
They will be small, simplified, and 
standardized. Each AFSPACECOM mobile 
satellite control node will be capable of 
performing routine functions for every 
AFSPACECOM-operated spacecraft. They 
will not be capable of performing all 
complex functions (e.g. major anomaly 
resolution), but will incorporate expert 
systems to allow maximum performance 
of non-routine functions. Survivable, 
warfighting control elements for both 
spacecraft control and mission control 
will be exercised on a day-to-day basis. 
Assured connectivity with higher head­ 
quarters i$ needed.
FORCE ENHANCEMENT
Force enhancement, the second space 
mission area, involves use of space 
assets to assist terrestrial forces in the 
accomplishment of their missions. Mis­ 
sions include surveillance and warning 
from space (both tactical and strategic), 
communications, navigation assistance, 
and environmental monitoring. Require­ 
ments for this mission area are com­ 
pletely dependent upon definition and 
advocacy by global Unified and Specified 
(U&S) Commands - the warfighting
10-7
users. These requirements undergo con­ 
tinual, incremental changes. The United 
States Space Command (USSPACECOM) is 
charged with monitoring these require­ 
ments, keeping them up to date, and lead­ 
ing other U&S commands in advocacy for 
these space systems. The "scrubbing" and 
consolidating of these requirements is 
still in progress and needs to be com­ 
pleted. Therefore, the following require­ 
ments should be considered preliminary 
in nature and will be updated as more 
information becomes available.
Overtime, DOD has evolved a strategy of 
consolidating maximum possible force 
enhancement capacity on individual 
satellites designed for high reliability 
and long life. This strategy has maxi­ 
mized use of existing infrastructure to 
fulfill user requirements at the highest 
possible cost efficiency. The growing 
dependence upon and integration of space 
assets into warfighters' operations, how­ 
ever, is demanding more responsiveness, 
survivability, and ease of operation for 
these systems. Therefore, a requirement 
is evolving for responsive vehicles to 
quickly replace or reconstitute lost cap­ 
ability and to surge existing capability. 
Responsive, survivable systems would 
supplement and complement multi- 
mission, long lived satellites as re­ 
quired by field commanders.
SURVEILLANCE AND WARNING. Both dedi­ 
cated and shared systems are needed for 
this function.
A. PEDIQATEP STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. 
Wide area surveillance systems are 
needed. They will provide information
both to USCINCSPACE and to other thea­ 
ter CINCs according to geographical 
areas of interest. As opposed to "nation­ 
al" programs, these dedicated DOD sur­ 
veillance systems will be controlled by 
AFSPACECOM. Therefore, all will employ 
standard control interfaces, will include 
autonomy sufficient for six months op­ 
erations without control, and will be cap­ 
able of internetting so as not to require 
overseas control nodes. They will also be 
simplified and ruggedized for a standard­ 
ized launch environment. Dedicated down­ 
links to terrestrial users will be pro­ 
vided and assigned on a priority basis. 
Information on disposition and move­ 
ment of air, sea, and ground forces will 
be collected and disseminated as re­ 
quired. Tracking targets of interest, 
while not necessarily continuous, will 
be updated frquently. Numbers of targets 
and percentage of global coverage re­ 
quired at any one time, along with other 
requirements, are found in AFSPACECOM 
WASBSS SONs. Survivability of these 
systems, as well as their spacecraft and 
mission control nodes, is required. They 
are expected to be high priority targets 
for an adversary's antisatellite sys­ 
tems. Satellite hardening, maneuver, and 
proliferation should be considered, as 
well as maintaining a reserve capability 
on the ground for quick reaction launch. 
Technical and cost trades are needed.
B. SYSTEMS DEDICATED TO TACTICAL 
USERS. Rapid response tactical surveil­ 
lance systems are required to supple­ 
ment and reconstitute dedicated wide 
area surveillance systems. These are en­ 
visioned as unispectral systems,possibly 
augmented by multispectral sensors,
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capable of approximately one meter 
earth resolution and three meter rela­ 
tive position accuracy. Their primary 
mission will be battlefield surveillance. 
(See Defense Science Board Summer 
Study 1988, and USAF SON 902-87 for 
details.) The second use is for damage 
assessment following a general nuclear 
exchange. For this purpose, survivable 
launch and satellite control systems are 
required. The same spacecreaft can be 
used for both purposes. These surveil­ 
lance systems will be controlled by 
AFSPACECOM. Therefore, all will employ 
standard control interfaces, will include 
autonomy sufficient for six months oper­ 
ations without control, and will be cap­ 
able of internetting so as not to require 
overseas control nodes. They will also be 
simplified and ruggedized for a standar­ 
dized launch environment. Dedicated 
downlinks to tactical users will be 
provided.
C. SHARED SYSTEMS. Information 
gathered by tactical missile warning, 
ballistic missile defense, space control, 
and/or national systems will also be of 
interest to U&S commanders. Rapid dis­ 
semination of information from these 
systems to field commanders is essen­ 
tial. Normal transmission of mission 
data to primary users of these systems 
will not be interrupted. Rather, that in­ 
formation will also be sent to a dedi­ 
cated USSPACECOM operations center 
where data tailored to each using U&S 
command will be stripped, formatted, 
and retransmitted. Standardization of 
equipment, procedures, formats, and 
protocols is required.
COMMUNICATIONS. Both dedicated and 
shared systems also contribute to satis­ 
faction of communications requirements.
A. DEDICATED SYSTEMS Communications 
satellites owned by the Department of 
Defense (DOD) will serve a variety of mil­ 
itary and national users. All dedicated 
communications satellites will be oper­ 
ated by AFSPACECOM. Therefore, all will 
employ standard control interfaces, will 
include autonomy sufficient for six 
months operations without control, and 
will be capable of internetting so as not 
to require overseas control nodes. They 
will also be simplified and ruggedized 
for a standardized launch environment.
Control of the communications packages 
themselves, however, will vary, depen­ 
ding upon primary use and function. All 
dedicated communications satellite sys­ 
tems as well as their spacecraft and mis­ 
sion control nodes must be survivable. 
Technical, cost, and performance trades 
are required to determine the best 
means of accomplishing this goal. Com­ 
munications coverage required is 100 
percent of the globe, 1 00 percent of the 
time. Various frequencies and band- 
widths may be employed to satisfy 
heavy, routine, peacetime demands. The 
measures of merit for providing this 
service are cost and efficiency. For war­ 
time use, however, frequencies, band- 
widths, and throughput will be designed 
to counter electronic jamming and 
atmospheric scintillation, as well as to 
prevent interception of signals by an 
adversary. Wartime throughput required 
to satisfy national command authorities 
(NCA) as well as U&S command require-
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ments need to be collected, consoli­ 
dated, and validated by USSPACECOM in 
cooperation with its components, the 
JCS, and the Defense Communications 
Agency.
B. SYSTEMS DEDICATED TO TACTICAL 
USERS. If, after a rigorous analysis of 
future requirements, a shortfall in 
wartime communications capability is 
found to exist, rapid response tactical 
communications systems will be re­ 
quired. These are envisioned as augmen­ 
tation systems used to surge existing 
capability or to rapidly replace or recon­ 
stitute lost capability. They would be 
used first for battlefield communica­ 
tions. (See Defense Science Board Sum­ 
mer Study 1988 for details.) The second 
use is for reconstitution of terrestrial 
forces following a general nuclear ex­ 
change. For this purpose, survivable 
launch and satellite control systems are 
required. The same spacecreaft can be 
used for both purposes. These communi­ 
cations systems will be controlled by 
AFSPACECOM. Therefore, all will employ 
standard control interfaces, will include 
autonomy sufficient for six months oper­ 
ations without control, and will be cap­ 
able of internetting so as not to require 
overseas control nodes. They will also be 
simplified and ruggedized for a standard­ 
ized launch environment. Dedicated down­ 
links to tactical users are required.
C. SHARED SYSTEMS. Civil, commercial, 
and allied systems offer potential addi­ 
tional communications capability for 
DOD. In many instances, these systems 
are already rn use for routine, peacetime 
purposes. If further compatibility with
DOD requirements can be achieved, use 
of these systems may obviate the need 
for dedicated tactical communications 
systems. In this case, enhancements to 
selected systems in this category would 
be required to enable them to perform a 
wartime augmentation role. They must 
be simplified and ruggedized for a stan­ 
dardized launch environment. Addition­ 
ally, Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs), 
standard procedures, and standardized 
satellite control interfaces are required 
to enable wartime use. Air Force Sys­ 
tems Command assistance is required to 
implement these changes, interface with 
the various organizations involved, and 
plan for normal turnover to AFSPACECOM 
as required. Wartime control of these 
selected systems will be accomplished 
from existing, survivable AFSPACECOM 
conrol nodes. This control capability 
will be exercised on a routine basis.
NAVIGATION. Although several commer­ 
cial and allied systems exist, all DOD 
requirements can be satisfied by the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) and its 
planned upgrades. Additionally, all DOD 
terrestrial vehicles are expected to 
employ autonomous onboard navigation 
gear, as required, to supplement GPS 
data.
GPS upgrades will incorporate enhanced 
survivability measures for both the 
spacecraft and control nodes. Space­ 
craft control will be accomplished from 
standardized, interoperable AFSPACECOM 
control centers. Therefore, these centers 
will employ standard control interfaces, 
and spacecraft will be capable of inter-
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netting so as not to require overseas 
control nodes. The satellites will also be 
simplified and ruggedized for a standar­ 
dized launch environment. Operations and 
maintenance in control centers will be 
greatly simplified over today's stan­ 
dards. (See previous section on satellite 
control requirements.) Wartime control 
will be accomplished from survivable 
units shared with other satellite sys­ 
tems. Satellite autonomy will be im­ 
proved, to include longer periods be­ 
tween navigation uploads.Global cov­ 
erage is required 100 percent of the 
time. Sufficient spacecraft spares will 
be maintained to ensure this coverage 
throughout the conflict spectrum. Trade 
studies are required to determine 
whether ground or on-orbit sparing 
should be used.
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING. Both 
dedicated and shared systems are 
currently in use.
A. DEDICATED SYSTEM. The criticality of 
a dedicated, DOD environmental moni­ 
toring space system will remain high. 
Vulnerability must be reduced and surviv- 
ability enhanced. Maneuverabilty of 
spacecraft is desired. Alternate constel­ 
lation configurations from that used 
today need study. Back-up systems 
- either spares or other (shared) 
satellites - are required. Studies are 
needed to determine how to best store 
dedicated DOD environmental sensing 
satellites on orbit. The preferred initial 
choice is to store at high altitude, then 
move to an operational orbit when 
needed. The data requirement is for 
global coverage, twice daily. This sys­
tem will be controlled by AFSPACECOM. 
Therefore, it will employ standard con­ 
trol interfaces, will include autonomy 
sufficient for six months operations 
without control, and will be capable of 
internetting so as not to require over­ 
seas control nodes. Control from shared, 
mobile nodes will be exercised daily. 
Satellites will be simplified and rug­ 
gedized for a standardized launch envi­ 
ronment. With the space segment and 
control segment made more survivable, 
the user segment needs emphasis. Direct 
downlinking is only one method of provi­ 
ding user data. Survivable transmission 
from a survivable CONUS node over war­ 
time communications lines should be 
fully examined as an alternative.
B. TACTICAL AUGMENTATION SYSTEMS. 
If survivable, on-orbit sparing concepts 
prove infeasible for primary environ­ 
mental monitoring spacecraft, or if a 
surge capability is mandated by users, a 
supplementary System may be required. 
Such a system could employ orbits dif­ 
ferent from those used for primary sys­ 
tems in order to provide more continuous 
coverage over areas of particular inter­ 
est. Multispectral sensors might even 
permit augmentation of tactical missile 
warning along with environmental sen­ 
sing, while still using simplified and 
standardized spacecraft. These vehicles 
would preferably be stored on earth in 
order to allow flexibility of placement 
according to geographical area of need. 
These supplemental systems would be 
controlled by AFSPACECOM. Therefore, 
all would employ standard control inter­ 
faces, include autonomy sufficient for 
six months operations without control,
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and be capable of internetting so as not 
to require over-seas control nodes. They 
would also be simplified and ruggedized 
for a standardized launch environment. 
Dedicated downlinks to tactical users 
would be required.
C. SHARED SYSTEMS. To the maximum 
extent practiceable, all other available 
environmental sensing systems, both 
space-based and terrestrial-based, will 
be incorporated into an integrated DOD 
environmental monitoring system. This 
includes civil, commercial, and allied 
systems. To a large extent, this is done 
today. Survivable transmission of this 
integrated product to users is required. 
Enhancements to selected space systems 
in this category are also required to en­ 
able them to perform a wartime augmen­ 
tation role. Presently, both TIROS and 
GOES fall into this category. They must 
be simplified and ruggedized for a stan­ 
dardized launch environment. Addition­ 
ally, Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs), 
standard procedures, and standardized 
satellite control interfaces are required 
to enable wartime use. Air Force Sys­ 
tems Command assistance is required to 
implement these changes, interface with 
the organizations involved, and plan for 
normal turnover to AFSPACECOM. War­ 
time control of these selected systems 
will be accomplished from existing, 
survivable AFSPACECOM conrol nodes. 
This control capability will be exercised 
on a routine basis.
RPVs via satellites appears to offer 
significant benefit. This area requires 
further study and analysis. Range and 
stealth of RPVs is steadily increasing, 
making their use over enemy territory 
more practcal. Use of GPS and other nav­ 
igational enhancements allow precise, 
autonomous flight, but real-time down­ 
link of data via satellite relay also indi­ 
cates a need for real-time flight path 
alteration. This would allow reattack for 
closer looks at areas of unexpected inter­ 
est. Part of the study in this area should 
include capability and cost trades with 
dedicated battlefield surveillance sys­ 
tems described earlier.
CONTROL OF REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES 
(RPVs). WhHe not presently advocated 
as a requirement, remote control of
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